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INTERNAL - POLITICS (UNCLASSIFIED)

1. CPSU Program: The third program in the history of the CPSU was published in draft form in all papers on Sunday, July 30. Much longer than the 1919 (second) program written by Lenin (120 pages as against 20), with few exceptions the prggram contained nothing particularly surprising.

The program includes one institutional change, which might some day have real significance. It provides for "systematic renewal" of membership in party and government organs. The idea is to change at least one-quarter of the CC and Presidium and one-third of most other bodies with every "election" of the body in question. Heralded as a step in the further democratization of party and government, in fact the move will provide a useful means of "retiring" deadwood without actually resorting to purges, and may even be utilized as an instrument of control by means of which the top clique can eliminate potential rivals. Additionally, as a safeguard to those in power, a three-quarters vote will permit persons of "recognized authority" to retain office legally. Summarized, the "renewal" procedure will operate as follows:

Party or Government Body	Mandatory Minimum "Renewal" each Election	Prescribed Minimal Frequency of Elections For Body	Program states: "not more than three consecutive terms." Presumed Maximum Tenure 1/
1. Central Committee of the CPSU	one-quarter	At party congresses every four years	12 years
2. Presidium of the CC of the CPSU (now 14 full members)	one-quarter	(Same as above)	"As a rule not more than three successive terms" (12 yrs)
3. Union Republic Parties: Central Committees Krai and Oblast party committees	one-third	Every 2 years 2/	6 years "Not more than three successive terms" 3/
4. National Okrug Party Committees City Party Committees Raion Party Committees	one-half	Okrugs: 2 years Cities and raions: annually 4/	6 years or 3 years
5. "Soviet" (legislative branch of government)	one-third	USSR Supreme Soviet: every 4 years All others: 2 years (Krais, oblasts & AO's, cities and villages).	12 years or 6 years 5/

Notes:

1/ All limitations on tenure contain the proviso that a longer stay in office can be legalized if 3/4 of the body vote to retain the individual. Only in the top party organs is it specified that the vote must be conducted in secret.

2/ The Kazakh, Uzbek, Belorussian and Ukrainian party congresses are to be called not less often than once every four years.

3/ Basic party organization secretaries may serve only two consecutive terms — subject again to the extraordinary provisions of note 1/.

4/ Large cities which are themselves divided into raions (e.g. Moscow and Leningrad) have their elections not less often than every two years.

5/ The "approval" mechanism spelled out for deputies seeking a fourth consecutive term provides that the delegates shall first be re-elected; then the newly-elected body decides if "his election shall be considered valid" by a 3/4 vote of those present. An adverse vote, presumably, would require a by-election.

The biggest question still to be answered concerning the "renewal" procedure is whether it will enter into force retroactively. The new party Statute (By-Laws), to be published in draft on August 20, may provide more information on this question.

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

2. International Political Aspects of Party Program: Something under one-half of the new CPSU Program is devoted to Moscow's world view and an assessment of the world Communist movement. While the document shed little light on probable Soviet intentions regarding specific international problems (e.g. UN, troika, Berlin, were not even mentioned), it was obviously designed to leave the impression that the prospects for negotiated settlements are good and nuclear war is unlikely. The main international significance of the new program seemed to lie in its potential for exploitation as a score-card of alleged Soviet successes and "capitalist" decline, contrasting the situations of the USSR and the Western powers at present and in 1919, when the previous program was adopted. Through restating Communist dogma and guidelines for action in this formal manner, the Soviets also will try to reassert their ideological influence over the world Communist movement, particularly vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists.

Although the Chinese Communists were not identified as practitioners of "dogmatism" and "sectarianism", and although the Yugoslav heresy of "revisionism" was in one place mentioned as the main danger to the world movement, the document as a whole made little distinction between dangers from the right and the left. The program seemed to be phrased in such a way that a potential ideological break between Moscow and Peiping during the twenty-year period covered could be represented as a loss of Communist gains in China alone, rather than as a mortal danger to the world Communist movement as a whole.

Great importance was attached to newly independent countries, which were credited with having brought about the alleged change in the world correlation of forces. Formerly, this had been ascribed primarily to the growth of Soviet military and economic power.

The paramount importance attached by the USSR to avoiding nuclear war seemed to be reflected in a series of foreign-policy objectives by listing the necessity for improving relations with capitalist countries right after a call for the development of relations with underdeveloped countries and ahead of an appeal for the strengthening of solidarity with the "international working class".

The program appeared to add little to what had previously been said publicly by Khrushchev regarding the role of war in expanding Communism, the question of whether revolutions should be peaceful or violent, or other aspects of policy involving the latent contradiction between Soviet state interest andworld Communist objectives.

3. USSR and Berlin

a. [redacted]

b. President's Speech: One week after its delivery, the Soviet press still had not commented directly on the President's July 25 speech. However, foreign reactions were reported in such a way as to give an idea of main Soviet propaganda criticisms of it. Among these were the charge that the President, while not closing the door to negotiations, made no specific proposals, that the Berlin crisis was being used as a pretext to continue the arms race, and that the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe wanted "to draw a line under World War II" as proposed by the Soviets.

In reporting Secretary Rusk's July 28 press conference, the Soviet press noted that the Secretary had expressed satisfaction with the reaction by NATO allies to the call for increased military commitments, defended West German rearmament, and announced that the U.S., British, and French Foreign Ministers would meet in Paris to discuss the question of negotiations. The Soviet press said, however, that the Secretary declined to indicate what the basis for negotiations would be, and whether the West would make concessions.

Congressional approval of the President's request to mobilize a quarter of a million reservists, and committee-level approval of "the largest peacetime military budget", were noted in several Moscow papers without comment.

4. Disarmament: The Moscow phase of the US-Soviet bilateral talks on disarmament ended on July 29 without any agreement on the forum for the projected future multilateral discussions or the principles which might guide such negotiations. Just before the recess, the Soviets, after much prodding on the part of the US, presented a paper setting forth their views on the question of principles. An understanding was reached that the bilateral discussions would resume in New York on September 5. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

5. Congo: An "Observer" article in Izvestiya of August 1 ridiculed Munongo's press conference comment of July 20 to the effect that Katanga would turn to the Soviet Union for aid. Munongo's effort was characterized as a clumsy maneuver and a desperate attempt to maintain Katanga as a separate state. The article adds that

[redacted]

the Soviet Union could not take seriously reports about the despatch of a mission from Elizabethville to socialist countries. The Soviet Government's support for Antoine Gizenga was reiterated in the article. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

6. Sudan: While the joint Soviet-Sudanese communique published July 28 following the visit of Abboud to Moscow condemned colonialism, it could not be interpreted as being directed against the U.S. or as a document supporting the Soviet propaganda thesis that the U.S. is the center of "neo-colonialism." In addition to laying the basis for economic cooperation and cultural exchanges, the communique announced that the USSR at the request of Sudan had agreed to extend economic and technical assistance. The communique thus marks a break in past Sudanese policy under which economic relations with the USSR were restricted mainly to trade. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

7. Ghana: The Embassy received information from a Ghanaian source that several formulations useful to the Soviets which were contained in the joint Soviet-Ghanaian communique issued after Nkrumah's visit to Moscow were not regarded by Nkrumah as politically significant or as transgressing grounds of neutrality. Reportedly, Nkrumah accepted the wording on Germany in the belief that such a vague formulation would do no harm. The Ghanaian source stated that his government would be prepared, on a suitable occasion, to issue a similar statement leaning towards the Western position on Berlin. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. Iran: An "Observer" article in the July 27 issue of Izvestiya accused the Shah, Prime Minister Amini, and the U.S. of using strong-arm methods in connection with the National Front demonstration of July 21 to prevent the natural development of correct national policies in the interest of the Iranian people. The article denied that the Soviets had incited the demonstration, although it admitted to a Moscow Radio broadcast which "told the truth about Iran," and its alleged enslavement to foreign interests who are using Prime Minister Amini. It went on to charge that the Iranians were taking instructions from the U.S. Ambassador who in turn received his orders from CIA. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

9. UAR: The treatment of Communists in the UAR came under sharp attack in a recent issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism, a Soviet-bloc journal. The attack stands in sharp contrast to current articles in the Soviet press which suggested that Soviet-UAR state relations had not been affected by the mutual press recriminations of last June.

COMMENT: The dual treatment of this issue in bloc literature points up the dilemma which Moscow faces when it attempts to maintain good official relations with the UAR for the purpose of extending Soviet influence in the Near East and Africa while at the same time exerting itself to support indigenous Communists or, at least, avoid giving the impression that the Soviet Union condones their suppression. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

10. Nepalese Ambassador Presents Credentials: Dzarendra Narayana presented his credentials as Nepalese Ambassador to the USSR on July 27. According to information received earlier from a Soviet Foreign Ministry source, Nepal will henceforth maintain a resident embassy in Moscow. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

MILITARY

11. Soviet Navy Day: The annual observance of Soviet Navy Day was held on July 30. The principal known display of Soviet naval strength was presented in Leningrad and, in the main, was composed of over sixty warships and more than sixty naval jet bombers (some missile equipped) and helicopters. For the first time three new classes of missile ships and one new class of conventional submarines were officially shown to the public. Live television and radio coverage of the Leningrad festivities were also received in Moscow, and a fireworks display occurred in the capital during the evening. This year's celebration was in marked contrast to those of previous years, in that a serious attempt was made to impress the Soviet public and the world with the power of the Soviet fleet. There is little doubt that this aim was accomplished, at least insofar as the Soviet public is concerned; however, coverage in both the Soviet and Western press was largely overshadowed by publication of the draft Communist Party Program. (UNCLASSIFIED)

For the Ambassador:

R.T. Davies
First Secretary of Embassy

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